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PLANTINGA, PLURALISM AND 
JUSTIFIED RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
David Basinger 
According to Alvin Plantinga, it has been widely held since the Enlighten-
ment that if theistic beliefs are to be considered rational, they must be based 
on propositional evidence. It is not enough for the theist just to refute objec-
tions. The theist "must also have something like an argument for [such a] 
belief, or some positive reason to think that the belief is true."1 But this is 
incorrect, Planting a argues. Basic beliefs are beliefs not based on proposi-
tional evidence; such beliefs are "properly basic in a set of circumstances" 
if they can be so affirmed in those circumstances "without either violating 
an epistemic duty or displaying some kind of noetic defect."2 And, according 
to Plantinga, theistic beliefs can be properly basic. For example, he argues 
that "under widely realized conditions it is perfectly rational, reasonable, 
intellectually respectable and acceptable to believe there is such a person as 
God without believing it on the basis of evidence-propositional evidence 
vs. the kind instanced by 'the evidence of the senses'."3 
But can a properly basic belief such as this have any epistemic credibility 
(warrant) if it is not conferred by other propositions whose epistemic status 
is not in question? Yes, Plantinga replies. There are two significantly different 
ways in which a proposition can acquire warrant. There is propositional 
warrant-warrant conferred by an evidential line of reasoning from other 
beliefs. However, there is also nonpropositional warrant. 
[We have] cognitive faculties designed to enable us to achieve true beliefs 
with respect to a wide variety of propositions-propositions about our im-
mediate environment, about our interior lives, about the thoughts and expe-
riences of other persons, about our universe at large, about right and wrong, 
about the whole realm of abstracta-numbers, properties, propositions, states 
of affairs, possible worlds and their like, about modality-what is necessary 
and possible-and about [ourselves]. These faculties work in such a way that 
under the appropriate circumstances we form the appropriate belief. More 
exactly, the appropriate belief is formed in us; in the typical case we do not 
decide to hold or form the belief in question, but simply find ourselves with 
it. Upon considering an instance of modus ponens, I find myself believing 
its corresponding conditional; upon being appeared to in the familiar way, I 
find myself holding the belief that there is a large tree before me; upon being 
asked what I had for breakfast, I reflect for a moment and then find myself 
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with the belief that what I had was eggs on toast. In these and other cases I 
do not decide what to believe; I don't total up the evidence (I'm being 
appeared to redly; on most occasions when thus appeared to I am in the 
presence of something red; so most probably in this case I am) and make a 
decision as to what seems best supported; I simply find myself believing.4 
And from a theistic point of view, Plantinga continues, the same is true in the 
religious realm. Just as it is true that when our senses or memory is functioning 
properly, "appropriate belief is formed in us," so it is that God has also created 
us with faculties which will, "when they are working in the way they were 
designed to work by the being who designed and created us and them," 
produce true theistic beliefs.' Moreover, if these faculties are functioning 
properly, a basic theistic belief thus formed "has positive epistemic status to 
the degree [the individual in question finds herself] inclined to accept it. "6 
But what of the alleged counterevidence to theistic beliefs? What, for 
example, of all the arguments which conclude that the theist has no justifiable 
basis for believing in God? Can they all be dismissed as irrelevant? Not 
immediately, answers Plantinga. We must seriously consider alleged 
defeaters of our basic beliefs. We must, for instance, seriously consider the 
claim that religious belief is mere wish fulfillment and the claim that God's 
existence is incompatible with (or at least improbable given) the amount of 
evil in the world. But to undercut such defeaters, we need not engage in 
positive apologetics: produce propositional evidence for our beliefs. Only 
"negative apologetics" -the refutation of such arguments- "is required to 
defea t. .. defeaters. '" 
Moreover, it is Plantinga's conviction that such defeater defeaters do nor-
mally exist. With respect to belief in God's existence, for example, he main-
tains that "the nonpropositional warrant enjoyed by [a person's] belief in God 
[seems] itself sufficient to turn back the challenge offered by some alleged 
defeaters" -e.g., the claim that theistic belief is mere wish fulfillment. And 
other defeaters such as the "problem of evil," he adds, can be undercut by 
identifying validity or soundness problems or even by appealing to the fact 
that "experts think it is unsound, or that the experts are evenly divided as to 
its soundness."8 Thus, even considering all the seeming evidence against 
God's existence and other theistic beliefs, Plantinga is stilI inclined to believe 
that at least some such beliefs are "properly basic for most theists-even 
intellectually sophisticated adult theists. "9 
There is much that Plantinga says with which I agree. His contention that many 
individuals simply discover theistic beliefs formed in them seems to me to be 
correct. Philosophers and theologians have for millennia discussed the 'evidence' 
for and against various theistic beliefs. But it is doubtful that many theists initially 
acquire theistic beliefs on the basis of such evidential discussions. Many, if not 
most, appear to have just found themselves with the inclination to affirm such beliefs. 
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And his contention that such beliefs are generated by divinely created 
religious belief-forming faculties which produce beliefs in a manner analo-
gous to our visual and moral belief-forming faculties also seems acceptable. 
Of course, those who believe there is no God will not believe that any of our 
belief-forming faculties are divinely created. But Plantinga only claims that 
this is what he and other theists believe to be the case. Thus, in a day when 
a 'convincing' refutation of God's existence seems less likely than ever, 
Plantinga's qualified contention appears safe. 
In fact, if we drop consideration of the origin of the faculties in question, 
Plantinga seems to be offering us a very plausible description of how certain 
theistic beliefs are in fact initially formed in many theists. Few deny that we 
have 'visual faculties' which receive external data-e.g., light reflected off 
a tree-process such data, produce in us visual images expressible by prop-
ositions such as "I am being appeared to treely," and then incline us to believe 
certain things-e.g., that there actually is a tree in front of us. And, analo-
gously, it seems quite plausible to believe that many humans possess 
'faculties' (whether or not they are held to be 'mental' and/or 'physical' and 
whether or not they are held to be divinely and/or naturally created) which 
receive external data-for example, encounter the starry heavens-process 
such data, and then produce both the religious concepts expressible by prop-
ositions such as "God exists" or "God has spoken to me" and the inclination 
to believe these propositions to be true. 
However, I shall argue that the undeniable existence of pervasive religious 
pluralism places knowledgeable theists under a prima facie obligation to do more 
than engage in negative apologetics. It requires such theists to attempt to produce 
positive evidence for their religious beliefs. And I shall then discuss the impli-
cations of this fact for Plantinga' s claim that some theistic beliefs are "properly 
basic for most theists-even intellectually sophisticated adult theists." 
I 
It seems to me that the essence of Plantinga's model of belief justification 
can be captured in what I shall label his Negative Apologetical Thesis (NAT). 
NAT: For a theist to be in a position to maintain justifiably that the basic 
religious beliefs formed by her religious faculties are properly basic-Le., to 
be in a position to maintain justifiably that her basic formed beliefs are true 
even though she has no "positive reason" to think they are true-she is only 
obligated to defend herself against the claim that her religious faculties are 
not functioning properly-Le., are not functioning as they are intended to 
function or are not producing true beliefs. 
Or, to be even more explicit about those aspects of NAT with which this paper 
will be concerned, it seems to me that Plantinga is making two related, but 
distinct, claims about negative apologetics. He is claiming that a theist is not 
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obligated to produce independent evidence for the beliefs that her faculties 
have formed. And he appears to be claiming that she is also not obligated to 
establish the reliability of her own religious faculties-Le., he is claiming 
that she can assume the reliability of her own religious faculties until they 
are proven faulty. 
But why accept NAT? Specifically, why should a theist assume her reli-
gious faculties are reliable until proven unreliable rather than assume such 
faculties are unreliable until proven reliable? The most popular argument for 
this aspect of NAT-and one to which Plantinga seems at times at least 
implicitly to be appealing-can be called the General Reliability Argument 
(GRA). We as humans, it is held, are naturally endowed with a considerable 
number of belief-forming faculties. As a result, many of us simply find 
ourselves believing we are 'seeing' a tree or believing that we had eggs 
yesterday or believing we have a headache or believing that from the con-
junction of (a then b) and (a), (b) follows or believing God exists. Now, in 
general, we cannot prove that such formed beliefs are true and, thus, on this 
basis, that our faculties are reliable. Some of the greatest philosophical 
minds-e.g., Descartes and Hume-have tried but with a notable lack of 
success. But the onus is not on us to furnish such proof. We all rely on these 
faculties daily, and in general they serve us quite well. In fact the assumed 
reliability of such faculties serves as the basis for some of our most noncon-
troversial examples of 'knowledge'. So our basic stance toward such facul-
ties-including our 'religious' faculties-should be to assume they are 
'innocent until proven guilty'. 
In short, the argument is that since we as humans can justifiably assume, 
without proof, that religious faculties in general are reliable, an individual 
theist can justifiably assume, without proof, that her own religious faculties 
are reliable until proven otherwise. 
Now with respect to most of our human faculties-e.g., our visual facul-
ties-GRA seems noncontroversially true. But can our 'religious faculties' 
be considered appropriately analogous to our other faculties in this context? 
Or, to put the question in its more useful form, is there any reason not to 
assume that religious faculties are as reliable as visual or auditory or infer-
ential faculties? 
When considering the formed beliefs of many individuals in specific, homo-
geneous cultural contexts, the answer to this latter question would appear to be 
no. For, in these contexts, all of the faculties in question appear to function in 
an analogous manner: they all produce consensus. That is, it is not only the case 
that most individuals in such cultural contexts find the same basic visual and 
inferential and auditory beliefs being formed in them; they also find the same 
basic religious beliefs being formed in them. Thus, such individuals quite jus-
tifiably assume that their religious faculties are as reliable as the others. 
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However, when we survey the 'world scene', a major difficulty arises. The 
problem, of course, is that on a world-wide scale, religious faculties consis-
tently and pervasively produce a myriad of different, often incompatible, 
basic religious beliefs. 
For instance, such faculties produce no common conception of God. Most 
theists conceive of God as a 'supreme being' in some sense. But there is little 
consensus on such a being's essential characteristics. While some find them-
selves believing in the existence of a being who is 'personal', others do not. 
Rather, they find themselves believing either that God is some sort of imper-
sonal force or that God is simply the sum total of all there is. And while some 
find themselves believing that God is the sole, unilateral creator and control-
ler of all, others find themselves believing that God can unilaterally create 
or control nothing. All reality, they maintain, is always co-creative. In fact, 
the 'religious' faculties of some individuals produce disbelief in the existence 
of any sort of 'supreme being'. 
Now, of course, such divergence can be explained in part by the fact that 
many individuals have never observed human activity outside of their own 
culture or have not been exposed to alternative theistic and nontheistic per-
spectives or have not seriously analyzed them. However, even among those 
knowledgeable individuals who have considered roughly the same data, noth-
ing close to a basic consensus has emerged. Their visual faculties generally 
produce similar visual beliefs in similar settings. Their memories draw forth 
similar beliefs in similar settings. And their introspective and inferential 
faculties frequently produce similar beliefs in similar contexts. But their 
religious faculties simply do not. 
In short, pervasive religious pluralism brings into serious question whether we 
ought to consider religious faculties to be analogous to other belief-forming 
faculties in the way GRA suggests. The existence of such pluralism gives us no 
reason to deny that religious faculties produce beliefs in us in a manner analogous 
to the way visual or auditory faculties produce beliefs. But since the reason we 
do not question the reliability of most of our faculties is that such faculties 
consistently generate similar beliefs in most individuals, the fact that religious 
faculties do not, in general, produce similar beliefs in similar contexts does make 
it much more difficult to assume they possess the same sort of reliability status. 
That is, this lack of consensus in the religious realm makes it difficult to assume 
that religious faculties, in general, produce true beliefs. And if this is so, then, 
of course, GRA is greatly weakened (I personally believe defeated) as a justifi-
cation for affirming NAT-or, more specifically, is greatly weakened as a basis 
for assuming that we need only defend our religious belief-forming faculties 
against the claim that they are unreliable. 
It will not help here, it must be explicitly noted, to move to the religious 
version of GRA to which Plantinga explicitly appeals: our human faculties-
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including our religious faculties-can be assumed innocent until proven 
guilty because they "have been designed, no doubt, with reliability in mind" 
by an all-powerful, all knowing creator. tO This changes the 'origin' of the 
alleged reliability. But the same problem remains. How can religious faculties 
justifiably be assumed to possess the same degree of reliability as that granted 
other belief-forming faculties when religious faculties do not produce con-
sensus in a manner analogous to the others? 
If I am correct, where does this leave the proponent of NAT? If she is no 
longer in a position to assume that her own religious belief-forming faculties 
are reliable because religious faculties, in general, can justifiably be assumed 
to be so, must she now abandon this aspect of Plantinga's negative thesis? 
She might conclude that she must. That is, she might conclude that, in the 
absence of some helpful version of GRA, she must now do more than simply 
defend herself against attacks on the reliability of her own religious faculties, 
which is all that NAT requires. She might decide that each theist must now 
independently establish the reliability of her own religious faculties-inde-
pendently identify positive reasons for believing her own faculties are reli-
able-before she can justifiably claim that the religious beliefs they form are 
properly basic. 
However, in Plantinga's own words, to believe one must have "some pos-
itive reason to think" a belief is true is to be an evidentialist. Thus, although 
to abandon NAT in this manner is not to become an evidentialist with respect 
to the beliefs one's religious faculties have formed, it is to become an 
evidentialist with respect to the other aspect of Plantinga's negative 
apologetical thesis: the reliability status on one's own religious faculties. 
This is not to say, it must be explicitly emphasized, that Plantinga ought 
not, himself, be viewed as an evidentialist in any sense. He does appear to 
view GRA (in its religious and/or natural version) as a form of evidence-as 
a positive reason-for holding certain opinions about our formed beliefs. 
Specifically he seems to see GRA as a basis for claiming that a theist can 
assume her religious beliefs to be 'innocent until proven guilty' -i.e., as a 
reason for believing each theist need not independently establish the reliabil-
ity of her religious faculties. But the proponent of the line of reasoning in 
question, on the other hand, sees the inadequacy of GRA as a reason to believe 
each theist does need to establish independently the reliability of her religious 
faculties. Thus, this theist has now become an evidentialist in the exact sense 
Plantinga claims in NAT she need not. 
It might be argued, however, that the proponent of NAT ought not give up 
so easily. The existence of pervasive religious pluralism does seriously chal-
lenge any version of GRA as a justification for the affirmation of NAT But 
the burden of proof still lies with the critic. We may not have good reasons 
for holding that religious faculties are in general reliable. But it is still the 
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case for any given theist that, unless it can be established that her specific 
religious faculties are in fact unreliable, she remains wholly justified in main-
taining that her formed beliefs are properly basic-can be affirmed without 
positive evidence. In short, it might be argued that a theist can still justifiably 
affirm Plantinga's negative apologetical thesis, even if she can no longer 
justifiably appeal to some version of GRA. 
It seems to me, though, that this line of reasoning is unacceptable. The 
existence of pervasive pluralism does challenge, and I think defeat, any 
version of GRA designed to allow us to assume the general reliability of 
religious faculties. But I believe that such pluralism also functions as a direct 
challenge to the affirmation of NAT itself-as a direct challenge to the claim 
that to defend the proper basicality of our formed religious beliefs, we need 
only defend ourselves against attacks on such beliefs and the faculties which 
have produced them. An illustration related to another type of belief-forming 
faculty may be helpful. Let us assume that Tom and Bill, both students in the 
same Introduction to Philosophy class, are discussing a forthcoming exam. 
What soon emerges is that, while Tom believes the exam is on Friday, Bill 
believes it is on the following Monday. Before their discussion neither had 
any reason to doubt he was correct. Both had been in class the day the exam 
date was announced, and neither had previously had any reason to believe 
his auditory faculties or memory was not functioning properly. 
But what is the proper epistemological response now that a conflict has 
arisen? An improper response, obviously, would be for either Bill or Tom to 
assume immediately that his faculties had, in fact, not functioned in a reliable 
manner and, thus, that his formed belief ought no longer be considered true. 
And the same, I believe, holds in the religious realm. It is undeniably the 
case, for instance, that Christians or Hindus or Buddhists often find the 
religious beliefs formed in them to be incompatible with the religious beliefs 
formed in the members of other religious groups. But this fact alone is not a 
justifiable reason for a proponent of any given religious perspective to assume 
immediately that her religious faculties are, in fact, unreliable and thus that 
the beliefs formed by such faculties ought no longer be affirmed. ll 
Does this mean, accordingly, that the knowledgeable theist who becomes 
aware of the pervasively pluralistic nature of religious beliefs is under no 
greater epistemic obligation than before? Can it be argued that since the 
existence of religious pluralism is not a sound reason for giving up any 
specific theistic belief, the theist can justifiably dismiss further consideration 
of this phenomenon and simply continue to assume her religious faculties are 
producing beliefs which are properly basic-i.e., can justifiably continue to 
maintain that her formed beliefs can be affirmed without positive evidence. 
I do not think so. Conflicts between beliefs produced by other faculties, 
we all know from experience, sometimes occur because one of the faculties 
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was not functioning properly. For example, two students have sometimes 
'heard' different test dates because one had an ear infection or wax in his ear 
or was taking a prescription drug which had affected his hearing and/or 
memory. Moreover, we also know from experience that such conflicts can at 
times be resolved by further investigation. For example, students can usually 
resolve a conflict of the type under discussion simply by calling the instructor. 
Accordingly, if the goal is to maximize 'truth' and minimizing 'error', then 
all parties are, I believe, under a prima facie obligation to attempt to resolve 
such conflicts. 
Now, of course, students may not always be interested in determining 
exactly when an exam is to be given. Perhaps they have already studied or 
plan not to study. But most theists (and nontheists) do claim to be interested 
in affirming 'truth' and avoiding 'error'. Thus, the existence of pervasive 
pluralism-the fact that seemingly reliable religious faculties continually 
produce incompatible religious beliefs-does, I believe place the knowledge-
able theist under the type of prima facie epistemic obligation in question. 
It must be emphasized, of course, that such an obligation is prima facie. 
There may be many legitimate reasons why it cannot in fact immediately or 
ever be discharged. A theist, for instance, may not have the time or resources 
to investigate further. Moreover, I do not believe that the mere existence of 
this obligation need have any immediate bearing on the epistemic status of a 
theist's formed beliefs.l2 This is not to say, of course, that a theist who 
becomes aware of religious pluralism may not, in fact, find herself less 
inclined to affirm certain formed beliefs. And information uncovered during 
an attempt to resolve the conflict in question may well lead a theist to believe 
she is now more or less justified in affirming her formed religious beliefs 
than she was initially. However, the mere recognition of the existence of the 
obligation in question does not itself require her to modify her epistemic 
attitude toward her formed beliefs. 
But I am arguing that once the theist becomes aware of the pluralistic 
challenge, she can no longer justifiably choose to retain a purely defensive 
posture. Or stated differently, I am arguing that the knowledgeable theist 
cannot justifiably claim that because the existence of pervasive pluralism 
does not require her to abandon her formed beliefs, she is under no obligation 
to consider the matter further. If she desires to determine the 'truth' of the 
matter to the extent possible, she is obligated, in principle, to engage in 
further investigation. The arena of positive apologetics must at least be en-
tered. The game of 'negative apologetics' will no longer be enough. 
Or, to put all this more explicitly into the language of NAT, the existence 
of pervasive pluralism is not a sufficient reason for believing that any given 
theist's formed beliefs are false or that her belief-forming faculties are unre-
liable. Nor, as we shall see, is the existence of such pluralism a sufficient 
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reason in every case to deny that our formed religious beliefs can ultimately 
be considered properly basic. But religious pluralism does challenge the 
assumption that a theist need only defend her formed beliefs and the reliabil-
ity of the faculties which have produced them to preserve the proper basicality 
of such beliefs. The knowledgeable theist, I am arguing, is obligated to 
attempt to resolve the pluralistic conflict-enter the arena of positive apolo-
getics-before any 'final' decision concerning the epistemic status of her 
formed religious beliefs can be made. 
What if someone refuses to attempt to meet this obligation? This, of course, 
is not relevant to the question of whether formed beliefs can or cannot, in 
principle, be considered properly basic. But for a given theist to purposely 
violate the duty in question does mean, I believe, that she has forfeited her 
right to claim that her formed beliefs are properly basic. For, as Plantinga 
himself has told us, basic beliefs can only be considered properly basic if 
they can be affirmed without "violating an epistemic duty." And the theist in 
question has in essence chosen not to attempt to maximize truth and minimize 
error and has, thus, violated one of the basic criteria for epistemically rational 
behavior.13 
II 
Let us assume that I am correct. This raises two distinct, but related ques-
tions. Can the pluralistic challenge be resolved? That is, can we determine 
which set of formed religious beliefs is true or most worthy of affirmation? 
And either way, can a theist justifiably continue to maintain that her formed 
beliefs are properly basic-i.e., can she justifiably continue to affirm such 
beliefs without possessing positive reasons for believing they are true? 
We will consider potential modes of resolution first. In what ways might 
the theist attempt to resolve the problem posed by religious pluralism? That 
is, in what ways might a theist attempt to improve her epistemic position in 
the debate? Further exploration of our student scenario may be helpful in this 
respect. If Tom and Bill really do desire to determine which, if either, has 
correctly remembered the day of the next exam, there are two basic ap-
proaches available. 
The first is to turn their attention directly to the formed beliefs in question. 
The most promising possibility along these lines would be to check with the 
instructor directly or at least see if the instructor has listed the test dates in 
the course syllabus. But this approach will obviously be of little value in 
attempting to resolve the challenge of religious pluralism. What makes this 
method of conflict resolution so promising in our student scenario is the fact 
that Tom and Bill agree on the identity of their instructor, agree that the 
syllabus in question was produced by this person and agree that they will be 
able to arrive at a mutually acceptable interpretation of what the syllabus 
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indicates concerning this matter. However, the very basis for the problem of 
religious pluralism under consideration is, at least in part, the fact that we as 
humans cannot seem to agree on the 'identity' of the being who can justifiably 
be labeled 'God' (or even agree that any such being exists). Moreover, even 
among those who do 'believe in God', there is no agreement on which set of 
writings, if any, can justifiably be considered an authoritative communication 
from this being. And finally, even among those who affirm the same divinely 
inspired, written revelation, there is often little agreement on what is actually 
said on important issues. 
There remains, however, other means by which Tom and Bill can attempt 
to assess their conflicting beliefs. If Tom and Bill aren't able to contact the 
instructor or find a syllabus, they might contact other students who had 
attended class on the day the date for the exam in question was announced. 
If all those contacted are in agreement with either Tom or Bill, then the issue 
will for all practical purposes be settled. But, of course, this method will also 
be of little value in the religious context since the pluralistic challenge only 
exists, at least in part, because no consensus of the requisite type has emerged. 
Finally, if Tom and Bill are also not able to contact a sufficient number of 
class members, they might attempt to construct some sort of evidential argu-
ment intended to establish directly the correct date. For example, they might 
attempt to discover if all the previous exams have been given on a certain 
day of the week and use this as an objective evidential standard for resolving 
the conflict. 
Now, of course, this approach has in fact often been employed in discus-
sions of religious pluralism. Many have given serious consideration to those 
independent arguments for or against the 'formed' beliefs in question-e.g., 
those arguments for or against the existence of the Judeo-Christian God or 
the claim that we as humans can communicate with such a being. And this 
approach has, in principle, the greatest potential for objectively resolving the 
conflict in question. In fact historically, many theists have thought the plu-
ralistic conflict can in this manner be resolved. That is, they have firmly 
believed that sound arguments do establish that the beliefs formed by the 
faculties of one set of religious individuals are alone true. Even today, many 
philosophers and theologians believe that the consideration of such arguments 
can help us clarify issues and possibly 'weed out' certain religious beliefs 
which are inconsistent or in other ways defective. However, few philosophers 
and theologians-especially those such as Plantinga in the analytic tradi-
tion-now believe that there exists any argument supporting a given set of 
specific theistic beliefs which obligates all who consider it to accept its 
conclusion. 
However, might there not at least be some way in which a theist can 
justifiably establish the truth of her formed beliefs for herself? That is, might 
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it not be the case that, although she cannot produce arguments which obligate 
all individuals to acknowledge that the religious beliefs which have been 
formed in her are more worthy of affirmation that those incompatible beliefs 
produced by the faculties of others, she can at least establish that she is 
justified in believing her own formed beliefs are most worthy of affirmation? 
One possibility along this line presents itself. 
Many theists, someone might argue, believe that God has produced an 
external epistemic standard by which we can judge our formed beliefs. Many 
Judeo-Christians, for instance, believe the Bible to be the ultimate epistemic 
standard in relation to which believers not only can, but must, assess the 
'accuracy' of their formed beliefs. Now, of course, such an evaluation tool 
cannot be used to resolve the pluralistic challenge in an objective, 'public' 
sense. But it can be used justifiably by a theist to resolve the pluralistic 
challenge in a personal, 'private' sense. That is, a theist who accepts the 
epistemic authority of this external standard can justifiably cite consistency 
with this standard as a basis for believing that only those formed beliefs 
consistent with her own are true. In one sense, this line of reasoning seems 
quite plausible. If we grant a theist her independent grounds for believing not 
only that her God exists and has created her with religious belief-forming 
faculties but also that this being has produced an authoritative written and/or 
natural epistemic standard, then there appears to be little reason, in principle, 
not to grant that she could justifiably use such a standard to attempt to resolve 
the pluralistic challenge for herself. 
But this line of reasoning generates a negative response to the other ques-
tion with which we are presently concerned: the question of whether, in the 
face of religious pluralism, a theist's formed religious beliefs can still be 
considered properly basic. For if the consideration of the pluralistic challenge 
has led a theist to believe that she must assess her 'formed beliefs' by an 
independent epistemic standard before she can justifiably accept them as true, 
then, of course, such beliefs can no longer be considered basic. Whatever 
positive epistemic status such beliefs now possess is based primarily on the 
theist's independent grounds for the acceptance of the assessment standard 
in question. In short, such a theist has now clearly become an evidentialist. 
But there are, as mentioned earlier, two basic approaches available to those 
attempting to resolve epistemic conflicts of the type under consideration. One 
can, as we have seen, attempt to establish directly that one set of formed 
beliefs is true. But one can also tum one's attention to the reliability of the 
faculties in question. That is, one can attempt to find reasons for supposing 
that one's belief-forming faculties are working better than one's rivals. For 
example, Bill and Tom might try to assess the reliability of their belief-form-
ing faculties by attempting to determine whether either had stayed up too late 
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the night before the relevant class or had been taking some form of medication 
or had been talking to another student when the announcement was made. 
This approach, of course, has also often been employed by those attempting 
to resolve the challenge of religious pluralism. Many theists have argued, for 
instance, that their opponents have faculties which have been damaged by 
'the fall' or are under the control of some evil force or have been desensitized 
by too much interaction with 'worldly' concerns. But, not surprisingly, those 
criticized in this manner do not agree. In fact, they criticize the reliability of 
their opponents' faculties on exactly the same grounds. And I can see no 
objective, nonquestion-begging basis for determining which, if any, of the 
parties in this debate is correct. 
But cannot the theist at least use this approach to attempt to resolve the 
pluralistic challenge for herself? It will, of course, not help her in this context 
to make any sort of appeal to the reliability of religious belief-forming fac-
ulties in general. It won't help her, for example, to argue with Plantinga that 
she as a theist can trust her own faculties because she has good reasons to 
believe they "have been designed, no doubt, with reliability in mind" by an 
all-powerful, all-knowing creator. 14 Such reliability, if established, only ex-
acerbates the pluralistic challenge. For the better the reasons we have for 
assuming that religious faculties are, in general, reliable, the harder it be-
comes to make sense of the fact that such faculties generate such a wide 
variety of often incompatible beliefs. 
But what if a theist maintains that she has what she considers to be adequate 
reasons for believing that the religious faculties of only a small subset of 
individuals (herself included) function reliably? What if she maintains, for 
example, that she has good reasons to believe that the 'fall' tainted the 
religious faculties of all but a select few (herself included), whose faculties 
God has chosen to reinfuse with reliability. As stated earlier, she will cer-
tainly not be able to establish this fact in an objective, public sense. But if 
we grant her this contention, can't she then justifiably argue that the problem 
of pluralism has been resolved for her personally? And, more importantly, 
can't she also justifiably contend that her formed religious beliefs retain their 
proper basicality? 
I believe the answer to both questions is yes. If we grant a theist the 
exclusivity thesis in question, then I see no reason to deny she has justifiably 
resolved the pluralistic challenge for herself. And she has done so without 
appealing to arguments whose conclusions are the formed beliefs in question. 
She has done so rather by establishing the epistemic superiority of the belief-
forming faculties from which the beliefs in question have come. Thus, I 
believe such formed beliefs can justifiably be considered basic-i.e., not 
themselves based on propositional evidence. And since she has met her ob-
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ligation to attempt to resolve the pluralistic challenge, I believe these basic 
beliefs can be considered properly basic. 
However, by approaching the pluralistic challenge in this manner, our theist 
has in a very important, anti-Plantingan sense again become an evidentialist. 
The proponent of NAT, remember, does not believe she is obligated to pro-
duce propositional evidence for her formed beliefs. Nor, more importantly, 
does she feel obligated to establish the reliability of her own belief-forming 
faculties-i.e., she believes she can justifiably assume her own religious 
faculties are innocent until proven guilty. But the theist in question acknowl-
edges that the pluralistic challenge obligates her to do more than simply 
defend her own religious faculties. She believes she must establish the 'epi-
stemic superiority' of her faculties. Moreover, she believes she has identified 
positive reasons for doing so-i.e., for maintaining that her belief-forming 
faculties are superior to those of her opponents. Thus, since to be an 
evidentialist in this context, remember, is to be someone who thinks we must 
have "some positive reason to think" a belief is true, our theist has again 
entered the evidentialist camp in a sense incompatible with one aspect of 
Plantinga's negative apologetical thesis. 
Where, then, does all this leave the knowledgeable theist who has discov-
ered no compelling 'public' or 'private' evidential basis for resolving the 
pluralistic challenge? That is, where does this leave the theist who can find 
no compelling public or private evidential basis for holding either that her 
specific beliefs alone are true or that her faculties are superior? Is there any 
nonevidential manner in which she can resolve the pluralistic challenge for 
herself while continuing to maintain justifiably that her formed beliefs are 
properly basic? 
I believe the answer to this question is yes. If a theist who has compara-
tively analyzed the various competing sets of religious (and nonreligious) 
truth claims in an attempt to resolve the pluralistic challenge has not uncov-
ered any compelling evidential basis for affirming hers, then I believe she is 
justified in resolving the conflict in her favor by an appeal to personal pref-
erence-a feeling (itself a basic, formed belief) that the set of basic religious 
truth claims she has found formed in her better organizes and explains the 
relevant components of reality than any other. Moreover, since she has met 
the relevant epistemic obligations by comparatively analyzing the competing 
sets of truth claims, I believe she is justified in claiming that her formed 
beliefs remain properly basic. 
However, it is important in closing to distinguish once again between this 
model of 'nonevidential' religious belief justification and that proposed by 
Plantinga. Plantinga is a nonevidentialist in the sense that he thinks that we need 
not search for propositional evidence to support our formed beliefs or the reli-
ability of our own belief-forming faculties. On the other hand, it is my contention 
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that, given the pluralistic challenge, the knowledgeable theist is required to 
look for such propositional evidence although she can justifiably continue to 
consider her formed beliefs properly basic even if none is found. 
Moreover, I believe this distinction is important. If leading analytic philos-
ophers of religion such as Planting a were to use their considerable skills not 
only to defend religious beliefs but also to evaluate comparatively the 
'content' of such beliefs, we could, I believe, begin to address seriously many 
of the theoretical and practical conflicts which differing religious perspec-
tives generate. IS 
Roberts Wesleyan College 
NOTES 
1. Alvin Plantinga, ~The Foundations of Theism: A Reply," Faith and Philosophy 3 
(July, 1986): 307. 
2. Ihid., p. 300. 
3. Alvin Plantinga, ~On Taking Belief in God as Basic," Wheaton College Philosophy 
Conference (October 23-25, 1986), Lecture I handout, p. 1. 
4. Plantinga, ~Justification and Theism," Faith and Philosophy 4 (October, 1987): 405, 
406. 
5. Ibid., p. 411. 
6. Ibid., p. 410. 
7. Plantinga, "The Foundations of Theism," p. 313, n. 11. 
8. Ibid., p. 312. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Plantinga, Justification and Theism, p. 413. 
11. To draw such analogies is not affected by the fact that we cannot consider our 
religious and other belief-forming faculties to be analogous in the context of GRA. In that 
context, the issue is whether all can be assumed to be equally reliable. The issue here is 
how we ought to respond to conflicts between formed beliefs, which can (and do) arise 
in relation to all our belief-forming faculties. 
12. Since the phrase 'epistemic status' has various meanings, it is important to state 
explicitly that in those instances in which I inquire about the epistemic status of a theist's 
formed beliefs, I will be concerned with the question of whether she is within her rights 
in affirming the belief. 
13. See, for example, David Basinger, "The Rationality of Belief in God: Some 
Clarification," The New Scholasticism 15 (Spring, 1986), pp. 163-85. 
14. Plantinga, ibid., p. 413. 
15. I would like to thank William Alston and William Hasker for helpful comments 
made on earlier drafts of this paper. 
